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Procedural Fair Use 
 





This article explores the advantages of opt-out plans and identifies 
a critical shortcoming in Copyright’s doctrine of Fair Use.  The 
discussion is fueled by a current controversy:  In December of 
2004, Google, Inc. announced its plan to digitally scan thousands 
of copyrighted books as part of a massive new digital indexing 
service.  Hedging against possible litigation, Google provided a free 
and easy opt-out procedure for authors who didn’t want their 
books scanned.  Despite this measure, two major authors’ groups 
have sued Google, claiming the opt-out plan imposes an unfair 
burden. This article explores the fairness of established opt-outs in 
contract law, privacy law, and class action rules.  Further, the 
discussion explores how Copyright already places similar burdens 
upon authors.  Ultimately, these lessons are applied to the Google 
Book Search problem, and an important new Fair Use 
consideration is identified. 
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¶ 1 In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced its plan to copy thousands of books 
protected by American copyright law.1  Google Book Search (formerly the Google Print 
Library Project) would require years of labor, the world’s most advanced scanning 
technology, and the cooperation of Harvard, Stanford, and Oxford Universities, as well as 
the University of Michigan and the New York Public Library.2  What was not required, 
Google believed, was the express permission of copyright owners. 
¶ 2 After being sued by The Author’s Guild in September of 2005, Google offered a 
public explanation for why its massive copying project did not constitute “massive 
copyright infringement:”3  The project’s purpose was to help people find books, not steal 
                                                 
1 Press Release, Google, Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 2004), 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html. 
2 Id. 
3  Press Release, The Author’s Guild, Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive Copyright 
Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues_google_citing.htm. 
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them.4  When presented with a search query, Google’s book search engine would look 
within its full-text database to locate pertinent titles.  Relevant page snippets (only a few 
lines long) would be presented to the user, along with information about where to buy the 
books.5  Google claimed their indexing system was protected fair use.6 
¶ 3 Supplementing Google’s fair use claims, however, was an even more interesting 
justification:  Any copyright holder who did not want her works included in Google’s 
index could simply opt out of the project.7  The search company pledged to honor such 
requests and even created a webpage to facilitate the opt-out process.8   
¶ 4 Against Google’s hopes, the opt-out plan failed to extinguish the ire of many 
anxious authors.  In September of 2005, the Author’s Guild said that the opt-out plan 
“turned longstanding precedents in copyright law upside down, requiring owners to 
preemptively protect rights rather than requiring a user to gain approval for use of a 
copyrighted work.”9  Patricia Schroeder, president and CEO of the American Association 
of Publishers (APP), another group that filed suit against Google in October of 2005, 
claimed that the opt-out plan “shifts the responsibility for preventing infringement to the 
                                                 
4  See Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s books, 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (“The Library Project’s aim 
is simple: make it easier for people to find relevant books – specifically books they wouldn’t find any other 
way such as those that are out of print – while carefully respecting authors’ and publishers’ copyrights.  
Our ultimate goal is to work with publishers and libraries to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual 
card catalog of all books in all languages that helps users discover new books and publishers discover new 
readers.”). 
5 See id.  (“When you click on a search result for a book from the Library Project, you'll see basic 
bibliographic information about the book, and in many cases, a few snippets – a few sentences showing 
your search term in context. If the book is out of copyright, you’ll be able to view and download the entire 
book. In all cases, you'll see links directing you to online bookstores where you can buy the book and 
libraries where you can borrow it.”). 
6 See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (BNA Books 2d ed. 
1995).  Fair use is a doctrine in American copyright law which permits the unlicensed reproduction of 
copyrighted works under certain circumstances.  The Copyright Act lists the following four balancing 
factors for use in determining the presence of fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
7  Information for Publishers About the Library Project, (Google, Inc.), http://print.google.com/ 
googleprint/publisher_library.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (“If you are a current Google Books partner, 
you can simply upload a list of your books you don’t want scanned through the Library Project. . . . If 
you’re not a Google Books partner and want us to avoid your books, you’ll need to provide us with a small 
amount of information about yourself as well as a list of the books you don’t want in Google Book 
Search. . . . We’re happy to remove your book from our search results at any time, just as we do for website 
publishers.  You’ll need to . . . let[] us know which books to exclude.”). 
8  Google Book Search, The Library Project Exclusion Registration, https://print.google.com/ 
publisher/exclusion-signup (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
9 Edward Wyatt, Writers Sue Google, Accusing It of Copyright Violation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, 
at C2.  
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copyright owner rather than the user, turning every principle of copyright law on its 
ear.”10 
¶ 5 Traditionally, opt-out schemes like Google’s would not be influential in 
determining whether copying is protected by the doctrine of Fair Use.11  In part, this is 
because the issue is somewhat new within the narrow context of copyright infringement.  
Only recently have projects such as Google’s sought to systematically record such 
massive amounts of data owned by such a multitude of parties that an opt-out plan would 
be useful.  But as we consider the benefits that might come from Google’s digital Library 
of Alexandria,12  the questions are clear:  To what degree should opt-out provisions 
influence copyright law?  When, if ever, should copyright infer consent from notice 
followed by inaction?  What are the social, legal, and economic strengths and weaknesses 
of opt-out programs?  These questions are at the heart of a fascinating new realm of 
copyright law that will ultimately determine how our society indexes and accesses 
creative works. 
¶ 6 The concept of opting out has already been of great importance, both in 
substantive and procedural law.  In contract law, the issue arises when an offeror imposes 
a burden on offerees to actively reject those offers to which they do not wish to be 
bound.13  American courts encountered this issue as early as 1893, when Justice Holmes 
rendered his decision in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., which concerned whether a 
recipient of eel-skins had, through his silent failure to reject the goods, tacitly accepted to 
pay the seller. 14   Holmes’ finding of acceptance through silence is reflected in the 
Restatement of Contracts, which explicitly allows for acceptance through failure to opt 
out of an offer.15  Known today as “negative option marketing,” the contractual opt-out is 
used by well-known mail-order businesses that send consumers goods in the mail along 
with a demand to either return the goods or pay for them.16 
                                                 
10 Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Google Library Project Raises Serious Ques-
tions for Publishers and Authors (August 12, 2005), http://www.publishers.org/press/ 
releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=274. 
11 The doctrine of fair use, for example, does not account for such procedures.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
12 “The Royal Library in Alexandria, Egypt, was once the largest in the world.  It is generally thought 
to have been founded at the beginning of the third century BC . . . .”  Said to have been seeded with 
Aristotle’s own private collection of books, it is rumored that all visitors to Alexandria were once “required 
to surrender all books and scrolls in their possession; these writings were then swiftly copied by official 
scribes.  Sometimes the copies were so precise that the originals were put into the Library, and the copies 
were delivered to the unsuspecting previous owners.”  Wikipiedia, Library of Alexandria, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  
13 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.14 (2nd ed., vol. 1 2001) 
(discussing situations in which “the offeror has reason to believe from the offeree’s silence that the offeree 
assents.”).  
14 Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893). 
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981) (“Acceptance by silence or exercise of 
dominion: Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an 
acceptance . . . Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject 
them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation.”). 
16  See, e.g, BMG Music Service: About Membership, http://www.bmgmusic.com/global/ 
how_membership_works.jhtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (“If you want it, do nothing; it will be shipped to 
you automatically. If you don’t want it, respond online or through the mail by the date specified. If you 
receive an unwanted Featured Selection, return it within 10 days at our expense and we will credit your 
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¶ 7 The same issue has recently arisen in privacy law.  For years, Americans have 
chosen to opt out of telephone solicitations by paying to have their phone numbers 
unlisted.17  Aware of widespread distaste for telephone sales calls, the FTC created the 
National Do-Not-Call Registry, which has received over 100 million registrations to 
date.18  The opt-out approach is also commonly used for solicitations sent via traditional 
mail.  In fact, the Direct Mailing Association (DMA), a trade association of companies 
that use direct-mail advertising, has received over 3.3 million consumer requests not to 
receive solicitations in the mail.19   
¶ 8 These recent developments dealing with “informational privacy”20 have important 
bearing on the Google opt-out issue.  This paper will explore why many consider opt-out 
systems to be superior to opt-in systems with respect to the indexing and use of consumer 
data.21   
¶ 9 The Author’s Guild’s lawsuit against Google ironically presents yet another 
domain where opting out is a preferred mode of operation: class action lawsuits.  It is 
almost comic to recognize that the very parties who call Google’s opt-out scheme an 
unfair burden on authors have instituted a class action requiring authors who do not wish 
to sue Google to opt out.  Like many class actions, the suit is governed by Rule 23(b)(3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,22 which requires that all members of a class be 
sent notice explaining the nature of the claims and their freedom to opt out of the suit.23  
In contrast to the earlier federal rule requiring parties to opt in to class action suits, many 
                                                                                                                                                 
account.”); Doubleday Book Club: Membership Agreement, http://www.doubledaybookclub.com (Click 
“Find Out More” to enter the website, then click “How to Join.”  From that page, click on “Membership 
Agreement.”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (“If you want the Featured Selections, do nothing; we'll send 
them to you automatically. If you want another book - or no book at all - reply by the specified date via the 
website or by returning the reply card enclosed with every catalog. You'll always have 10 days to decide.”); 
Membership Details at ColumbiaHouse.com, http://dvd-movies.columbiahouse.com/membership-details 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (“If you do want the Director's Selection, just sit back and relax - we'll send it 
to you automatically. . . .  You'll always have 10 days to review the offer. If . . . you receive an unwanted 
Director's Selection, you may return it at our expense and we'll credit your account.”). 
17 See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All: The Fight For Control of 
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (“The percentage of consumers willing to pay for 
unpublished numbers varies from state to state. In California, fifty-five percent of residential telephone 
numbers are unlisted, while in New York, only twenty-four percent of residents have unpublished.”). 
18  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Federal Trade Commission Chairman 
Deborah Platt Majoras on the 100 Millionth Number on the National Do Not Call Registry (Aug. 18, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/dncstatment.htm; DNC Registrations as of Aug 16 2005, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/050816dncregistrations.pdf. 
19 Sovern, supra note 17, at 1068. 
20  Id. at 1042 (quoting Jacob Sullum, Secrets for Sale, REASON, Apr. 1992, at 29, available at 
http://reason.com/9204/fe.sullum.shtml). 
21 See generally Michael E. Staten, The Impact of Opt-in Privacy Rules on Retail Credit Markets: A 
Case Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 745 (2002). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (1998) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 
class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances. . . . The notice must concisely and 
clearly state in plain, easily understood language. . . . that the court will exclude from the class any member 
who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded.”). 
23 See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc. (Sept. 20, 2005), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf (showing the applicability of Rule 
23(b)(3) to the action). 
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believe that the current opt-out scheme has made class action lawsuits more powerful 
instruments of change.24  The legal and sociological reasons supporting this rule shed 
light on how copyright law might handle the matter. 
¶ 10 Finally, the opt-out question has been addressed in copyright law itself, under 
circumstances almost identical to the Google Book Search controversy.  Currently, search 
engines—which operate by copying and indexing information online—utilize an opt-out 
scheme known as “webcrawler exclusion.”25  Copyright holders who do not want their 
material indexed by search engines can place a special text file on their web server 
entitled, “robots.txt,” which stands as a gatekeeper, instructing automated search 
programs not to index some or all of a website’s contents.26  Today, this is the most 
common method of preventing unwanted copying by search engines.27 
¶ 11 Common threads connect all of the examples above:  in each case, a centralized 
entity acts upon a large class of individuals;  rights are sacrificed, but only slightly so.  
Costs are balanced against conveniences, and burdens are placed on those who seem to 
best bear the load.  This article will explore these themes and define the factors that make 
opt-outs desirable.  Focusing on social, legal, and economic considerations, Part I of this 
article will explore the issue with respect to contract and privacy law.  In Part II, the 
success of opt-out class action rules will be analyzed.  Part III will study the opt-out rule 
with respect to copyright, and Part IV will apply the lessons learned in previous sections 
to the Google Book Search issue.  Ultimately, this article will argue that opt-out 
provisions should be considered as a new factor in fair use analysis. 
II. PRIVACY AND CONTRACTUAL OPT-OUTS 
A. Contracts: Negative Option Agreements 
¶ 12 Opt-outs are built on the idea that sometimes silence conveys acceptance.  In the 
business world, this assumption has proven to be ripe for exploitation by opportunists.  
Nevertheless, American contract law continues to recognize silence as a legitimate mode 
of assent. 
¶ 13 An early example of silence as acceptance dates from 1893, when Justice Holmes 
(then on the bench of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts) rendered his decision in 
                                                 
24 See generally Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 480 (1998). 
25  See generally Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion (1994), 
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
26 Id. 
27 The robots.txt standard is widely known by website administrators.  While it appears no formal 
empirical study has been performed on the matter, the popularity of robots.txt is recognized by major 
organizations, such as The Internet Archive, a prominent non-profit group. See, e.g., Removing Documents 
From the Wayback Machine, http://www.archive.org/about/exclude.php (“Robots.txt is the most widely 
used method for controlling the behavior of automated robots on your site . . . all major robots, including 
those of Google, Alta Vista, etc. respect these exclusions.”). 
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Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Company.28  In this seminal case, the plaintiff, a purveyor of 
eel skins, made a shipment to the defendant, who never explicitly placed an order.  The 
defendant had previously paid the plaintiff for unsolicited goods, but this time, the 
defendant kept the goods but refused to pay.29  Finding the defendant liable, Justice 
Holmes stated that “conduct which imports acceptance or assent is acceptance or assent 
in the view of the law, whatever may have been the actual state of mind of the party.”30 
¶ 14 Today, Section 69 of The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, states this principle 
as follows: 
§ 69. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion 
1. Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence 
and inaction operate as an acceptance in the following 
cases only: 
(a) where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services 
with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to 
know that they were offered with the expectation of 
compensation. 
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason 
to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or 
inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive 
intends to accept the offer. 
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is    
reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he 
does not intend to accept.31 
¶ 15 The concept of silence as acceptance is also recognized in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which governs commercial transactions between businesses in 
almost every state.32 
¶ 16 By requiring action on the part of offerees, common law essentially imposes an 
opt-out.  A well-known example of contractual opt-outs is the “negative option 
agreement.”  This business device was introduced in 1926, when Maxwell Sackheim and 
                                                 
28 Hobbs, supra note 14. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 495. 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1978). 
32 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) regulates commercial transactions in every state except 
Louisiana.  UCC § 2-606(1)(b) provides that “acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer . . . fails to make 
an effective rejection” after having had a reasonable opportunity to inspect.  A similar policy is expressed 
in § 2-327(1)(b), which states, “failure seasonably to notify the seller of election to return the goods is 
acceptance. . . .”  This is a reasonable policy, because merchants have usually negotiated before the time of 
shipment, and “most relevant contract terms have been ironed out.”  Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the 
Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance? 
9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 77, 94 (1993) (noting that in such common cases, “requiring an affirmative 
acceptance . . . would add an unnecessary transaction cost”). 
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Harry Scherman began the famous Book-of-the-Month Club.33  The business plan was 
simple:  first, consenting subscribers received advance notice of the monthly book.  If 
they didn’t want to buy it, they opted out by mail or telephone—otherwise, the book 
arrived at the subscriber’s door, along with a bill.34  Buyers were spared the time and 
trouble of searching for good books. For Sackheim and Scherman, the plan was a 
fantastically effective sales device, and launched the Book-of-the-Month Club to 
success.35 
¶ 17 Today, negative option marketing is most popular with book, CD, and movie-of-
the-month clubs, such as Columbia House and BMG, as well as cable, telephone and 
insurance companies.36  By placing an affirmative duty on offerees to avoid accepting 
contracts however, negative option agreements create a high potential for fraud.37  Since 
the time of Sackheim and Scherman, many unscrupulous businesses have abused 
negative option agreements by providing consumers with inadequate and misleading 
information, or making it difficult and costly to opt out.38  Victims of these scams have 
been bound to terms they never accepted, and goods they never wished for. 
¶ 18 American law has sought to curb these threats.  Under the common law of the 
Restatement and federal regulations, to impose negative option marketing on a consumer, 
a buyer and seller must be involved in an ongoing relationship (such as a book-of-the-
month club).39  Federal regulations also require the seller to properly inform the buyer of 
payment obligations and how to easily opt out.  The FTC’s Prenotification Negative 
Option Rule40, which applies to negative option agreements offered by telemarketers, 
requires disclosure of: 
all material terms and conditions of the negative option 
feature, including, but not limited to, the fact that the 
customer’s account will be charged unless the customer 
takes an affirmative action to avoid the charge(s), the 
                                                 
33 See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 
377, 378 (1999).  The Book-of-the-Month club was not truly a club, but a business.  The Franklin Library, 
established by Benjamin Franklin in 1731, is often cited as the nation’s first true book club.  In exchange 
for ten shillings per year, subscribers enjoyed the grand literary treasures that their pooled resources could 
buy.  See also A Brief History of the Library Company of Philadelphia, http://www.librarycompany.org/ 
instance.htm.  Over time however, and with some notable exceptions such as Oprah Winfrey’s book club, 
the term, “book club” has come to refer to businesses that send consumers books by mail. 
34 See Bowal, supra note 33, at 378. 
35 Id.  Maxwell Sackheim went on to become a highly regarded figure in the world of advertising.  See 
generally MAXWELL SACKHEIM, MY FIRST SIXTY YEARS IN ADVERTISING (Prentice Hall 1970). 
36 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions of Membership to BMG Music Service, supra note 16. 
37 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Children’s Book Publisher to Pay $710,000 to 
Settle Charges it Violated Commission’s Negative Option and Telemarketing Sales Rule (June 21, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/scholastic.htm  (describing Scholastic Inc.’s agreement to settle after being 
charged with operating a deceptive negative option book plan, in violation of an FTC rule). 
38 See generally Bowal, supra note 33. 
39 See the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3009(d), which prohibits offers in the form of 
merchandise from sellers unknown to buyers.  The logic behind this policy can be traced back to the words 
of Justice Holmes in Hobbs, supra note 14. 
40 16 C.F.R § 310.3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/legal.htm (click on “FTC Rules” and navigate 
to view section 310.3 of 16 C.F.R.) (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
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date(s) the charge(s) will be submitted for payment and the 
specific steps the customer must take to avoid charge(s).41 
¶ 19 While this rule pertains only to the telemarketing industry, it reflects the general 
consumer protection principle that “[s]ellers must give consumers information about . . . 
terms and policies, clearly and conspicuously, in their promotional materials.”42 
¶ 20 Despite such regulation, some consumer protection advocates still object to 
negative option contracts and contend that the high potential for consumer fraud warrants 
a complete ban.43  Why hasn’t their view prevailed?  The answer, discussed below, lies in 
the economic efficiency and fairness of opt-outs. 
B. Contracts: Analysis of Negative Option Agreements 
¶ 21 Unlike other opt-out examples in this article, negative option contracts directly 
concern the sale of goods.  This presents an opportunity to rigorously explore the 
economics of opt-outs.  The following model44 will later be useful in exploring opt-outs 
in the world of copyright. 
¶ 22 Consider a small mail-order book service.  Suppose the most a buyer is willing to 
pay for a given book (v), is twenty dollars.  The seller, through her experience in sales, is 
aware of this value, and looks for a suitable price to charge (p).  In a strict opt-in system, 
“book-of-the-month” clubs as we know them wouldn’t exist; offer and acceptance would 
be required for each sale, compelling the seller to spend money to entice consumers.  
This search cost (s) would involve advertising every monthly book to the public.  
Distributed, assume this cost amounts to ten dollars per book.  Interested buyers will 
incur a small communication cost, say, two dollars (r) to tell the seller they wish to buy.  
As a result, buyers will only purchase if the book is equal to or less than eighteen dollars 
( p ≤ v – r ).  Similarly, the seller can only profit by charging more than ten dollars – their 
advertising expense ( s < p).  In an opt-in system, a sale will only occur if the book costs 
between ten and eighteen dollars. 
¶ 23 The picture is quite different under an opt-out regime.  Here, we can imagine a 
typical book-of-the-month scenario.  Unlike the opt-in arrangement, buyers need not be 
stirred into action by advertisements; they will “buy” books through total inaction.  As a 
result, instead of spending ten dollars (s) to find willing buyers, the seller need only 
spend a small amount, say, one dollar (w), to inform customers of the monthly title, and 
how to opt-out.  (This could be accomplished with an email.)  Buyers will either keep the 
book and pay for it or send a refusal (r, set at two dollars above).  In this scenario, buyers 
                                                 
41 Id. at § 310.3(a)(1)(vii). 
42 Federal Trade Commission, Prenotification Negative Option Plans, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/ 
pubs/products/negative.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).  See also, Linda A. Goldstein, Shining a Light on 
the TSR’s New Negative Option Regulations, RESPONSE MAGAZINE, April 2003 at 54.  
43 See generally Bowal, supra note 33, at 390. 
44 This model is adapted from one presented by Avery Katz of the University of Michigan in his 1993 
article, Transaction Costs and the legal mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an 
Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?.  Katz supra note 32, at 80-81.  
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will purchase whenever the book is equal to or less than twenty-two dollars ( p ≤ v + r ).  
The seller will profit by charging anything more than one dollar—the cost of informing 
customers ( w < p ).  Thus, sales will occur if the book costs between one and twenty-two 
dollars.  This margin is clearly wider than the one created by the opt-in system, and will 
lead to more transactions.  The following table illustrates both models:45 
 
 Opt-out regime Opt-in regime 
Buyer does nothing Buyer gains:  v - p 
Seller earns:  p – w 
Buyer gains:  0 
Seller earns:  - s 
Buyer accepts  Buyer gains:  v – r - p 
Seller earns:   p – s 
Buyer rejects Buyer gains:  -r 
Seller earns:  -w 
 
Sale occurs when w ≤ p ≤ v + r 
(1 ≤ p ≤ 20 + 2) 
s ≤ p ≤ v – r 
(10 ≤ p ≤ 20 - 2) 
p = price of book (variable) 
v = maximum amount buyer is willing to pay ($20) 
s = cost of advertising book to buyer ($10) 
r = cost for buyer to communicate interest to seller (price to opt in) ($2) 
w = cost for seller to inform buyer how to opt-out (price to opt out) ($1) 
Table 1: Cost comparison of negative option agreements 
 
¶ 24 The conclusion that opt-outs result in more transactions is supported by empirical 
evidence.  In a recent survey conducted by the FCC, seventy-two telephone operating 
companies selling wire maintenance plans reported an average acceptance rate of eighty 
percent under negative option selling plans, as compared with forty-five percent under 
normal selling conditions.46  Similarly, cable television companies have reported thirty-
five to forty percent increases in channel subscriptions under negative option 
agreements.47  Profits from these higher sales “can be retained as higher margins or 
passed through to buyers in the form of lower prices, which may increase sales volume 
even further if more price-sensitive buyers choose to purchase at the new lower price.”48 
¶ 25 Of course, harm occurs when the price of opting-out is high.  In these cases, 
consumers are bound to pay high prices for goods they do not want.  Federal regulations 
and state common law attempt to forbid such abuses while permitting negative option 
                                                 
45 For clarity, this model does not account for the advertising costs associated with enticing consumers 
to sign-up for opt-out services such as the book-of-the-month club presented here.  This model assumes an 
existing subscriber base. 
46 Mark T. Spriggs & John R. Nevin, Negative Option Selling Plans: Current Forms Versus Existing 
Regulations, 15 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 227, 229 (YEAR) (quoting a 1998 FCC survey). 
47 Sovern, supra note 17, at 1092. 
48 Spriggs, supra note 46. 
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agreements to flourish where they are most valuable—when communication costs are low 
and business search costs are high.49 
C. Privacy: The National Do-Not-Call Registry 
¶ 26 In 1781, James Otis famously said, “[O]ne of the most essential branches of 
English liberty is the freedom of one’s house.  A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he 
is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.”50  The notion of one’s home as a 
stronghold of privacy was later enshrined in the Fourth Amendment,51 and has long been 
a pillar of the American identity.  In the 1980s, however, a new technology threatened 
domestic privacy:  telemarketing.  Armed with phone directories, troops of aggressive 
marketers interrupted the privacy of countless American homes.  The practice was often 
invasive, annoying, and sometimes capable of harm.52 
¶ 27 The problem came to a head in the early 1990s, leading Congress to enact 
regulations which sought to lessen the number of unwanted sales calls.53  The Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act, and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act directed the FTC and FCC to create new rules and measures that 
regulated telemarketing more closely.54   An early approach forbade businesses from 
calling people who had previously told those particular businesses not to call.55  As 
telemarketing grew more widespread however, most consumers agreed that this 
“company specific” approach just did not go far enough. 56   In response, Congress 
promoted the National Do-Not-Call Registry, which allows people to opt out of receiving 
most types of telephone solicitations.57 
¶ 28 The proposed do-not-call registry received overwhelming support from consumer 
groups, but some privacy advocates urged for an even more restrictive opt-in approach, 
which would prohibit “telemarketing to any consumer who ha[d] not expressly agreed to 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., The FTC’s Prenotification Negative Option Rule, supra note 40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 69, supra note 31.  
50  James Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance (Feb. 1761), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/268/8/9.html. 
51  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
52 See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 17, at 1070 (describing the pain of continuing to receive solicitations 
for women’s apparel after the death of his wife); ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER, 204-05 (Penguin, 
reprint ed. 1994) (describing “sadness, shattered feelings, family rifts, grief, doubt, and devastation” caused 
by direct-mail ads that struck a personal chord with recipients).  Larson reports that some ads included 
personal handwritten notes suggesting that recipients use anti-aging creams and diet pills.  These notes 
confused recipients into believing that the ads had been anonymously sent by people they knew. 
53 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991); The Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAPA) (1994). 
54 See generally id. 
55 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) (2003) (forbidding any telemarketer from calling a person when that 
person previously stated that he or she does not wish to receive calls).  See also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)-(f). 
56 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,630 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) 
(“[M]ost find even the initial call from a telemarketer or seller to be abusive and invasive of privacy.”). 
57 See generally National Do-Not-Call Registry, http://www.donotcall.gov (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
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receive telephone solicitations.”58  A fitting name might have been “The Please-Do-Call 
Registry.”  Pointing to strong consumer support for opt-in systems in other contexts, 
advocates urged that the approach would “more effectively protect individuals’ rights and 
ensure that only those who wish to be called receive solicitations.”59 
¶ 29 Rule-makers were not convinced.  While an opt-in might protect more consumers 
against unwanted calls, the FCC felt that “establishing such an approach would be overly 
restrictive on the telemarketing industry.”60  In public forums held by the FTC, the point 
was raised several times that an opt-in system would “dramatically increase[] costs for 
businesses” by requiring them to communicate to millions of potential customers in order 
to find those who would want to receive calls.61  In contrast, consumers could register for 
free on the opt-out do-not-call registry, and businesses would be given access at a low 
cost.  Further, it was recognized that an opt-in system would deprive many consumers of 
the opportunity to learn about products of possible interest to them.62 
¶ 30 Fortunately, it seems the rule-makers were right.  With over 100 million 
registrations to date and high consumer satisfaction, the National Do-Not-Call registry 
stands as an “enormously popular” success.63  The analysis below explores the particular 
features of telemarketing that lend it so well to opting out. 
D. Privacy: Analysis of Telemarketing Opt-Outs 
¶ 31 Consider a business that wishes to use telemarketing.  Under an opt-in “please-do-
call” approach, the business would need to spend a large amount of money to search for 
customers who wish to be contacted.  These expenses might include television 
advertisements, magazine inserts, or soliciting past customers.64  Alternatively, in the 
current opt-out regime, interested consumers don’t need to be motivated to opt in—they 
receive calls by default.  Here, businesses are spared high search costs, and need only 
                                                 
58 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,630 (“Consumer groups supported the creation of a 
national ‘do-no-call’ registry, and some privacy advocates urged the Commission to take an even more 
restrictive ‘opt-in’ approach by banning telemarketing to any consumer who has not expressly agreed to 
receive telephone solicitations.”). 
59 Electronic Privacy Information Center, DO-NOT-CALL COMMENT 3 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/dncpapercomments/04/epicetal.pdf (“EPIC”).  See also NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE, DO-
NOT-CALL COMMENT 10 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/ncl.pdf. 
60 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act 27 (2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-
03-153A1.pdf. 
61  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, RULEMAKING WORKSHOP, 65 (June 5, 2002), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/020605xscript.pdf. 
62 See id. (“The original question you asked was about why not have specific opt-in for calls, and I 
guess the simple answer to that is that the Commission in that approach is trying to do too much and that in 
doing too much it is dramatically increasing costs for businesses and reducing services for consumers.”). 
63  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY 2003 AND 2004: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, 3 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
donotcall/051004dncfy0304.pdf. 
64 At this point, it might be better for the company to simply advertise their products rather than 
advertise why consumers should opt-in to a telemarketing sales service. 
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spend a small fee to access the National Do-Not-Call Registry.65 
¶ 32 One might mistakenly conclude that when a high percentage of individuals wish 
to opt out, an opt-in telemarketing rule is more desirable.  The argument goes as follows: 
If only five percent of consumers wish to be called at home, why not place the burden of 
choice on the few rather than the many?  This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that 
opt-ins require businesses to spend large sums of money in advertising.66  In fact, it 
would be most expensive to locate the smallest groups of interested consumers.  By 
spending more money searching for potential customers, businesses are left with less 
money to serve existing customers.  This could lead to lower quality goods and services, 
higher prices, or, if search costs are high enough, an abandonment of telemarketing 
altogether.  In contrast, the cost savings provided by an opt-out could lead to continued 
telemarketing and possibly lower prices, greater shareholder returns and higher-quality 
goods and services. 
¶ 33 The advantages of telemarketing opt-outs are even more dramatic when viewed 
from a social perspective.  Assume three classes of affected individuals:  (1) those who 
know they want to be called by telemarketers, (2) those who know they do not want to be 
called, and (3) those who are apathetic.  Under an opt-in or opt-out regime where 
“opting” is free, the burden on groups (1) and (2) is arguably too negligible to form the 
basis of a compelling argument for either mode of operation.67  The truly important 
individuals comprise group (3).  Under the National Do-Not-Call Registry’s current opt-
out scheme, these parties still receive sales calls.  Presumably, some eventually grow 
annoyed enough to opt out.  However, some in this group eventually benefit—
telemarketing may inform them of a service or product interests them.  The opt-out 
system provides these individuals with a benefit where the opt-in system does not.  While 
opting in shifts the miniscule “burden” of choice away from those adverse to 
telemarketing, it does at a great cost to businesses and consumers. 
¶ 34 In sum, the National Do-Not-Call Registry illustrates that when the cost of 
“opting” is low and business search costs are high, opt-outs are the most economically 
efficient and socially desirable mode of choice.  
E. Conclusion: Economic Benefits 
¶ 35 This section does not advocate the virtues of telemarketing or book-of-the-month 
clubs.  Rather, the goal here has been to demonstrate two examples from the business 
world where opting out succeeds.  Like Google Book Search, both telemarketing and 
negative option agreements implicate the legal rights of a large number of individuals, 
                                                 
65  See Q&A for Telemarketers and Sellers About the Do Not Call Provisions of the FTC’s 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt129.htm (“Data for up to five 
area codes is free. The annual fee is $62 per area code of data (after five), with a maximum annual fee of 
$17,050 for the entire U.S. database.”). 
66 See generally Jared Strauss, The Do-Not-Call List’s Big Hang-Up, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 27 (2004), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i4/article27.pdf. 
67 Opting out is essentially free, while complaining about opting out can become expensive.  Under 
either regime, individuals in these groups will easily have their way. 
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while benefiting many in the process.  A lack of regulation would permit these businesses 
to violate personal rights, while opt-in enrollment would freeze valuable economic 
activity.  Opting out is a fair and functional compromise because it saves businesses high 
transaction costs while respecting the rights of those who want no involvement. 
III. CLASS ACTION OPT-OUTS 
¶ 36 The Author’s Guild and the American Association of Publishers claim that 
Google’s opt-out plan shifts an unfair burden onto authors.  In seeking to eliminate this 
burden, the Author’s Guild has remarkably and paradoxically replicated it in the form of 
an opt-out class action lawsuit.68  Pondering the oddness of this situation, one is reminded 
of M.C. Escher’s impossible staircases, on which one travels upward forever until their 
wits grow frail.  The true reason for this contradiction, however, lies in the power and 
equity of opt-out enrollment in the class action arena. 
A. The History of Class Action Opt-Outs 
¶ 37 At the birth of class suits during the sixteenth and seventeen centuries,69 parties 
did not fluidly join or leave classes by personal choice.  This was because legal “classes” 
were usually preexisting communities, such as villagers, parishioners, or manorial 
tenants.70  Individual grievances (or liabilities) were derivative in nature71 and decrees 
applied to the community as a whole.  Naturally then, judgments in some cases were 
binding even on community members who did not participate.72  In Brown v. Vermuden73 
for example, a vicar sued for the right to tithe from all miners in his parish.  The miners 
appointed four representatives to defend the suit and ultimately lost.  Some years later, a 
miner disputed his duty to pay the tax, based on the fact that he had not been a party to 
the earlier action.  The Chancellor held the miner by the earlier decree, explaining that to 
do otherwise would result in suits “infinite and impossible to be ended.”74  This early 
                                                 
68 See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc. (Sept. 20, 2005), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf (discussing the applicability of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) to the action). 
69 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1862-1885 (1998) (describing the evolution of class suits, beginning in the early 
seventeenth century).  This detailed and fascinating article provides the backbone for much of the historical 
discussion in this section. 
70 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action,  
77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 872 (1977) (“[E]very  sixteenth and seventeenth-century case of group litigation I 
have found involves the members of rural agricultural communities – manorial tenants, villagers, and 
parishioners.”). 
71  Id. at 871 (“Seventeenth-century group litigation is not about the legal rights of aggregated 
individuals but about the incidents of status flowing from membership in an agricultural community not yet 
part of a market economy.”). 
72 Hazard, supra note 69, at 1865 (“While it is risky to interject modern analysis into pre-modern 
situations, it does appear that Chancery in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries felt 
reasonably confident about the fairness of adjudicating rights of absentees where the absentees belonged to 
a preexisting group and some members of the group were before the court as litigants.”). 
73 Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676).  Brown v. Vermuden is widely-
cited in works explaining the evolution of class suits. 
74 Id. 
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account shows how claim preclusion (res judicata) resulted from the treatment of a 
preexisting group as a sort of “set or entity for procedural purposes.” 75 
¶ 38 Despite such early cases, equity courts became uncertain of the fairness in 
allowing a suit to proceed with absent class members (a question of joinder of necessary 
parties),76 and whether absentees should be bound after a judgment (a question of res 
judicata).77  During the nineteenth century, these concerns were soothed to some extent 
by the legal fiction that absentees impliedly authorized representatives when those 
representatives belonged to their community.78 
¶ 39 Questions of personal choice in class membership during this period first 
appeared in suits involving unassociated parties, such as creditors or legatees.79  As these 
were not preexisting groups, it seemed a strain to find implied authorization of 
representation on the part of absentees.  As a result, decrees in such cases were often 
“binding only on those absentees who had, prior to the litigation, some connection with 
the representative concerning the matter in litigation”80 – in effect, those who opted to 
associate themselves with the representative. 
¶ 40 While a complete study would require volumes, it can succinctly be said that the 
ability of absentees to define their membership both prior to and following judgment 
remained muddy and unsettled through much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.81  
In 1838, Justice Joseph Story attempted to crystallize the confusion by defining three 
types of classes: “where the question is one of ‘common or general’ interest, where a 
voluntary association is involved, and where the parties are so numerous that, without 
regard to any other criterion, it is impracticable to join them.”82  Unfortunately, Story’s 
definitions often overlapped and muddled questions of res judicata further.83   
¶ 41 Built upon Justice Story’s work, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 
inherited many of the same uncertainties.  Rule 23 originally permitted classes: 
[w]hen the character of the right sought to be enforced for 
or against the class is 
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the 
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a 
                                                 
75 Hazard, supra note 69, at 1865. 
76  Id. at 1866 (“Toward the latter part of the eighteenth century, Chancery began to apply the 
Necessary Parties Rule with greater inflexibility.”). 
77 See generally HAZARD ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 646 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining res judicata). 
78 See Hazard, supra note 69, at 1877 (explaining that suits were allowed to go forward with absent 
parties, if “the representatives appearing as parties were expressly or impliedly authorized by the absentees 
to sue or defend in their behalf”). 
79 See generally id. at 1866-78 (discussing creditor and legatee bills). 
80 Id. at 1878. 
81 Id. at 1877 (“The preclusive effect of a representative suit in English Chancery practice thus stood 
unsettled in the early nineteenth century.”). 
82 Id. at 1879 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 97, at 97-98 (2d ed. 
1840)). 
83 Id. at 1878-82 (noting that “Story’s treatment of the binding effect of a class suit decree is tentative 
and indeed puzzling.  His analytical system consists of categories that overlap. . . .”). 
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member of the class thereby becomes entitled to it; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication 
of claims which do or may affect specific property involved 
in the action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact 
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.84 
¶ 42 Under this formulation, absentees in type (1) or (2) suits could not define their 
membership, while absentees in type (3) suits had the right to opt in before or after a 
judgment had been rendered.85 
¶ 43 Opting in after a judgment, a practice which became known as “one-way 
intervention,” amounted to placing bets on a horse race after it had run.  A leading 
example of this behavior is Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,86 decided in 1961.  
In that case, thirty-six named miners sued for themselves and 350 unnamed miners, 
seeking damages for antitrust monopoly violations.  Only after the jury found in favor of 
the plaintiffs were the absentee miners identified and asked to come forward with claims 
for specific damages.  Presumably, a negative judgment would not have been binding on 
these unnamed parties. 
¶ 44 In an attempt to correct the unfairness of one-way intervention, the Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee transformed Rule 23(b)(3) in 1966 from an opt-in to an opt-
out rule.  The revised rule states: 
“In any class action maintained under subsection (b)(3), the 
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that 
(A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether 
favorable or not, will include all members who do not 
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not 
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance 
through his counsel.”87 
                                                 
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (repealed 1966). 
85 See, e.g., Am. Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“A recurrent source of abuse 
under the former Rule law in the potential that members of the claimed class could in some situations await 
developments in the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation 
would be favorable to their interests.  If the evidence at the trial made their prospective position as actual 
class members appear weak, or if a judgment precluded the possibility of a favorable determination, such 
putative members of the class who chose not to intervene or join as parties would not be bound by the 
judgment.  This situation – the position for so-called ‘one-way intervention’ – aroused considerable 
criticism upon the ground that it was unfair to allow members of a class to benefit from a favorable 
judgment without subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one.”). 
86 300 F.2d 561 (C.A. Utah 1961). 
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
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¶ 45 The Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying this revision explains that the 
opt-out approach served a dual purpose:  It provided a means to prevent one-way 
intervention,88  while also lessening the likelihood of res judicata questions after the 
judgment.89  Distinguished Judge Marvin Frankel famously summed-up Rule 23’s opt-
out rule by saying it appeared to be “patterned after the highly successful procedures of 
the Book-of-the-Month Club.”90 This change had an instant and dramatic impact on class 
formation, and is a “key premise for many of the basic principles that shape the b(3) 
action.”91 
B. Collective Action Benefits 
¶ 46 The opt-out approach in class action proceedings has benefits beyond curtailing 
one-way intervention.  Statistics indicate that most people, either through apathy or lack 
of information, do not reply to notice letters.  A 2004 survey of class action suits between 
1993 and 2003 reported that “on average, less than 1 [one] percent of class members opt-
out and about [one] percent of class members object to class-wide settlements.”92  While 
it depends on the particular case, it is generally assumed that most who fail to opt out do 
so out of lack of motivation. 93   (These ambivalent parties are analogous to the 
disinterested group discussed in the telemarketing section earlier in this article).  If a class 
suit only involved those who opted-in, this ocean of ambivalent parties would be 
completely lost, possibly leaving the number of supporters “too small to attract a lawyer 
for the group.”94  The Supreme Court articulated this point in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts,95 stating: 
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion 
would probably impede the prosecution of those class 
actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims, 
                                                 
88 See John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 17 n.82 (1983) 
(explaining the one-way intervention basis for the rule). 
89 See 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-106 (1966) (discussing the issue of res judicata disputes after judgment).  See 
also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 amendments were designed, in 
part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of the class 
would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and 
judgments.”); Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp., 483 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 391-92 n.136 (1967) (“In the Preliminary Draft the right to opt 
out was not unqualified; the court could deny it to a class member whose inclusion was found essential to 
fair adjudication.”). 
90 Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44 
(1967).  Here, we might say an even better analogy would be found in the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 
which, like class actions, presents an opt-out obligation that doesn’t stem from prior consent.  See also 
Kennedy, supra note 88, at 18 (noting that book-of-the-month clubs present opt-out burdens premised on 
prior consent). 
91  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (2004). 
92 Id. at 1532. 
93 See id. at 1561-62 (attributing “overwhelming inaction displayed by class members” to “apathy”).  
94 John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 909 
(2005). 
95 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (internal citation omitted). 
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where a large number of claims are required to make it 
economical to bring suit. . . .  The plaintiff’s claim may be 
so small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he 
would not file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively 
request inclusion in the class if such a request were 
required in the Constitution.96 
¶ 47 A simple example illustrates how the opt-in approach would hobble the class 
device:97  imagine if a corporation negligently constructed a product that wronged one 
million people each out of one dollar.  In an opt-in regime, few would bother spending 
the time and effort to reply to notice.  Ultimately, the few who opted-in would lack the 
necessary mass to make the corporation pay for the wrong it had committed.  The same 
scenario under an opt-out regime would produce an army of silent litigants nearly one 
million strong—large enough to correct the wrong and deter future harm. 
C. Procedural Due Process 
¶ 48 The Supreme Court has also recognized the power of opting out to establish 
personal jurisdiction over litigants in state court.  In Shutts, a party’s failure to respond to 
an opt-out request justified a state court’s jurisdiction over him even though he did not 
posses minimum contacts.  The underlying theory suggested by the Court was that class 
members who do not reply to opt-out requests implicitly submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal.98  
¶ 49 The right to opt out also supports the due process rights of absentees in class suits.  
In Shutts, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to provide additional protections “to 
protect what must be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to 
execute an ‘opt-out’ form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he cannot be 
presumed to consent to being a member of the class by his failure to do so.” 99  
Conversely, where opt-out rights are not provided, violations of due process have been 
found.100 
¶ 50 It is important to note that the right to opt out alone does not fulfill due process.  It 
is but one thread in a tapestry of guarantees that, together, give body to procedural due 
process in class suits.  Specifically, Rule 23(a) ensures congruence between the named 
representative parties and the absent parties by demanding that the “claims or defenses of 
the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and that they 
adequately represent the class.101  Further, the detailed notice requirements of Rule 23 
play an essential role in the opt-out process. 
                                                 
96 Id. at 812-813. 
97 See Bronsteen, supra note 94, at 909 (illustrating a similar example). 
98 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812-14 (discussing the issue of due process and implicit submission to the 
tribunal). 
99 Id. at 813. 
100 See, e.g., Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002); Westways World Travel, Inc. v. 
AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 241 (C.D. Cal 2003). 
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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D. Opting Out as a Check on Counsel 
¶ 51 Finally, some commentators posit that opt-outs act as a market check on the 
quality of counsel’s representation.102  Unlike strict opt-ins, opt-outs give counsel an 
incentive to provide good representation at the outset of a case, to avoid class attrition.103  
A court relying on this theory would be less burdened to scrutinize the adequacy of class 
counsel or representatives.104  
E. Conclusion: Social Benefits 
¶ 52 From small agricultural community disputes to massive corporate litigations, the 
law has struggled to treat absentees fairly.  The problem has been most thorny in cases 
where potential litigants have a choice of class enrollment.  The 1966 amendments to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure flipped the membership decision from an 
opt-in to an opt-out largely to curtail the unfair practice of one-way intervention.  But the 
benefits of opting out far surpassed this modest goal:  by marshaling the masses that 
don’t respond to class notification, the opt-out system enables justice to operate where it 
could not before.  Further, the opt-out system (combined with its accompanying notice 
requirements) works to ensure procedural due process.  Finally, opting-out acts as a 
market check on representative counsel. 
¶ 53 But an even deeper lesson can be learned:  while earlier discussions of substantive 
law (privacy and contract) showed a benefit to businesses, the adoption of opt-outs in this 
area of procedure demonstrates a benefit to society.  The fact that opting out can serve 
both economic and social goals will be crucial in analyzing Google Book Search, which 
itself possesses this duality. 
IV.  COPYRIGHT OPT-OUTS 
A. Registration, Deposit and Notice as Opt-Outs 
¶ 54 American copyright law has always placed affirmative duties on authors.  The 
requirements of registration and notice have changed since the original Copyright Act of 
1790, but remain important to all authors who value and seek to protect their rights.  It 
might be a surprise to hear these measures called “opt-outs,” but fundamentally, that’s 
just what they are:  affirmative duties that authors must perform to repel infringement. 
¶ 55 In the original Copyright Act of 1790, the requirements of formal registration and 
deposit were exhaustive and burdensome.  Commenting on the matter, the former 
Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, wrote that “[t]he most obvious and distinctive 
feature of the Act of 1790 is its extreme emphasis on compliance with formalities. . . . 
The 1790 Act displays an obsession with punctilios that goes beyond anything in any 
                                                 
102 See Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1536. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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earlier copyright legislation anywhere.”105  A quick look at the Act demonstrates this 
point:  Section 3 detailed the specific wording that had to be used upon recordation of 
deposit,106 and specified that within two months of publication, authors were to publish a 
copy of their registration record in a newspaper for a period of four weeks.107  Failure to 
satisfy such requirements resulted in forfeiture of copyright.108 
¶ 56 The burden of registration and deposit only grew with time.  In fact, the 1846 Act 
required a specific procedure by which authors had to deposit multiple copies of their 
work with both the Smithsonian and the Library of Congress.109  Subsequently, the 1909 
Act established submission of the correct number of deposit copies as a predicate both for 
obtaining registration (in Section 11) and for the commencement of an infringement suit 
(in Section 13).110 
¶ 57 Notice requirements have also historically been burdensome.  Introduced in the 
revised Copyright Act of 1802, detailed statements of notice originally had to be about 
100 words in length.111  It was not until 1874 that a shorter form (consisting of the word, 
“Copyright,” the year of registration and the author’s name) was introduced.112  The 1976 
Act introduced the recognizable symbol, © (the letter C inside a circle), along with the 
year of publication and the name of the author.113  Until the 1970s, notice requirements 
were enforced with absolute strictness.  As with registration, “technical failure to satisfy 
notice requirements when a work was published could work immediate, permanent 
forfeiture of all copyright protection under both state and federal law.”114 
¶ 58 Today, copyright formalities are more flexible, but still crucial for authors who 
wish to protect their rights.  For example, although the notice requirement is now optional 
(a result of the U.S.’s attempt to conform to international standards), lack of notice can 
lead to lowered statutory damages.115  Similarly, while formal registration and deposit are 
                                                 
105 JOYCE ET. AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 417 (6th ed., LexisNexis) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT]. 
106 Copyright Act of 1790, § 3 (“And the clerk of such court is hereby directed and required to record 
the same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, in the words following . . . ‘District of --- 
to wit: Be it remembered, that on the --- day of --- in the --- year of the independence of the United States 
of America, A.B. of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a map, chart, book or books . . 
.the right whereof he claims as author or proprietor . . . in the words following to wit: [insert the title] in 
conformity to the act of the Congress of the United State entitled ‘An act for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, chart, and book, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, 
during the time therein mentioned.’”). 
107 Id. (“And such author or proprietor shall, within two months from the date thereof cause a copy of 
the said record to be published in one or more of the newspapers printed in the United States, for the space 
of four weeks.”). 
108 COPYRIGHT, supra note 105 at 417. 
109 Id. at 448. 
110 Id. at 449. 
111 Id. at 435. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 436 
115 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (2006) (“If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified 
by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement 
suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on 
innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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no longer strict requirements for copyrightability,116 both are demanded of authors who 
wish to bring infringement suits.117 
¶ 59 It is plain to see that Congress has long compelled authors to affirmatively assert 
their rights.  Legislative history shows that a primary reason behind this policy was to 
maximize the number of works in the public domain.  A House Report printed in 1976 
explicitly stated that historically, a principal function of notice was that “[i]t has the 
effect of placing in the public domain a substantial body of published material that no one 
is interested in copyrighting.”118  Maximizing the effectiveness of a system by involving 
those who do not assert their rights is a concept that has appeared in every section of this 
article.  This theme will later be discussed with respect to Google Book Search.  For now, 
however, history makes one thing boldly clear:  authors have always had to act to inhibit 
infringement. 
B. ‘Robots.txt’ as an Opt-Out 
¶ 60 Authors must affirmatively act to protect their copyrights online.  In its youth, the 
Internet was much like the untamed American West:119  it was a place of great promise, 
but very difficult to navigate.  Users could only visit websites they already knew the 
names of (i.e., http://www.ebay.com), but were unable to easily locate new websites.  
This problem gave birth to the business of Internet directories and search engines.  Like 
intrepid explorers of the old west, search computer programs journeyed out onto the 
digital frontier, and made records of all the websites they found.  Internet users could 
then find new websites by telling search engines just what they were looking for. 
¶ 61 To be useful, however, search engines had to copy some of the content they found 
online.  This clearly raised a copyright dilemma:  how could search companies make 
information easier to find without trammeling on the copyrights of website owners?  
Although online photographs and literary works are fixed in digital form, they enjoy the 
full protections of copyright.120  That a work might be stored on a sheet of parchment, a 
magnetic tape, a compact disc, or a web server’s hard drive makes little difference for 
                                                 
116 Id. at § 408(a). 
117 Id. at § 411 (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”). 
118 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 143-44, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5759. 
119 Many people have likened the early Internet to the frontier west, both for its sense of promise and 
lawlessness.  The phrase “electronic frontier” was most famously adopted by The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, a nonprofit organization which seeks to preserve personal freedoms in the digital domain.  The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation was founded in 1990 by Mitch Kapor, former president of Lotus 
Development Corporation, John Perry Barlow, Wyoming cattle rancher and lyricist for the Grateful Dead, 
and John Gilmore, an early employee of Sun Microsystems.  Electronic Frontier Foundation, A History of 
Protecting Freedom Where Law and Technology Collide, http://www.eff.org/about/history.php (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2007). 
120 A work need not be readily perceivable for copyright protection to exist.  What matters is that a 
work can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  See also, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer 
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
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purposes of copyrightability.121 
¶ 62 Ultimately, the problem was solved with an opt-out scheme known as Robot 
Exclusion Headers (“REH”).122  The technology is less exotic than the name implies. 
REHs are brief computer commands which tell search engines what they should not copy 
from websites.  Copyright owners who do not want their material indexed store these 
commands in a text file named “robots.txt,” which lies at the top-level of a web server’s 
directory structure.  Today, this is the most common method of preventing unwanted 
copying by search engines.123 
¶ 63 A quick concrete example of an REH can be found at http://www.photo.net, the 










¶ 64 The “disallow” command is read by almost all search engines as the website 
owner’s desire to opt out of having their data copied,125 and the short words preceded by 
the “/” character are the names of protected folders. 
¶ 65 As the example shows, authors can be very specific in telling search engines 
exactly what not to index.  For example, a website operator who has two folders, “public 
journal” and “private diary” can list the latter folder in her robots.txt file to prevent it 
from being copied.  By not naming the “public journal” folder, the website owner silently 
consents to it being copied. 
¶ 66 This illustrates a unique advantage of the opt-out in the context of indexing 
systems.  Often, copyright holders may wish to have some—but not all—of their material 
included.  If web search engines were forced to operate by means of a strict opt-in, it is 
hard to imagine that such fine-grain choices would be possible.  An opt-in in this realm 
would require search engines to painstakingly and perpetually contact website operators, 
to ask for permission to index copyrighted material.  For practical purposes, strict opt-in 
would be the death of online search. 
                                                 
121 Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247. 
122 See generally KOSTER, supra note 25 (detailing the robot exclusion standard). 
123 See supra note 27.  See also Eric J. Feigin, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their 
Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934 (2004). 
124 http://photo.net/robots.txt. 
125 KOSTER, supra note 25. 
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V. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH 
¶ 67 Before analyzing the opt-out issue in Google Book Search, it is valuable to 
explore briefly the purpose and significance of the project itself.  A major weakness in 
traditional book catalogues and indices is the fact that readers often do not know how a 
book has been categorized.  Ignorant of this fact, readers are left to play guessing games 
to find what they are looking for.  The same problem exists when searching for 
information within a single work. 
¶ 68 Google Book Search solves this problem in a novel way.  Rather than requiring 
readers to guess the proper category that a work has been assigned to, Google’s index 
allows users to find books based on any word or phrase that appears in text.  Users enter 
phrases into the index, and the system presents a list of all books that contain those 
words, as well as vendors selling those titles.126  Although some authors ask Google to 
display a few full pages from their books to help entice readers, most book entries are not 
readable in any true sense.127  All that is provided to help users understand the context in 
which their search appears is a one or two-line snippet of text surrounding their search 
terms.128 By allowing the public to locate printed works based on such specific criteria,129 
the project promises to revolutionize the way people find books. 
¶ 69 Despite its vast potential as a sales vehicle, some authors object to Google Book 
Search.  These authors claim that, because the index relies on the full text of books, it 
impermissibly infringes on their copyrights.130  Google’s early response to these fears 
was to establish a simple opt-out system.131  Authors troubled by the inclusion of their 
works within the Google index can easily visit a website and request removal.132  Authors 
can also opt out prior to having their works indexed.133  The opt-out procedure is free, 
easily accessible online, and Google’s instructions are clear.134  In response, two large 
authors’ groups have instituted class action lawsuits, claiming Google’s opt-out system 
                                                 
126 See Google Books Library Project, supra note 4 (explaining how Google Book Search operates). 
127 Id.  Users are not able to read full pages or even paragraphs of copyrighted works.  Instead, 
“snippets” of text are presented to give the user a sense of context when viewing an indexed work. 
128 Id. 
129 The way an individual conceptualizes information affects the way they search for it.  Often, indexes 
reflect one’s unique appreciation and memory of that work.  This fact has been recognized by authors and 
woven into fictional narratives.  For example, in “The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire,” written by Sir 
Arthur Coonan Doyle, the detective Sherlock Holmes searches aloud through his own index of past 
matters:  “‘Voyage of the Gloria Scott,’ he read. ‘That was a bad business . . . Victor Lynch, the forger. 
Venomous lizard or gila. Remarkable case, that! Vittoria, the circus belle . . . Vipers. Vigors, the 
Hammersmith wonder. Hullo! Hullo! Good old index. You can’t beat it.’” 
 Another example appears in the book, “Cat’s Cradle,” in which the author Kurt Vonnegut suggests 
that indexing reflects an individual’s unique perceptions, and that a great deal can be learned about a person 
by the way he indexes a book. It seems the fact that we store information differently often leads us down 
different paths in searching for new information. 
130 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 3. 
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represents an unfair burden.135 
¶ 70 This legal dispute likely will center on whether Google’s index is protected by the 
doctrine of fair use.136  Traditional fair use analysis involves the weighing of four factors: 
(1) the purpose of the defendant’s use, (2) the nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, 
(3) the amount and substantiality taken by the defendant and (4) the effect of defendant’s 
use on the market for the plaintiff’s work.137  These four factors focus on the substantive 
fairness of a defendant’s use, but they do little to evaluate the procedural fairness of an 
opt-out plan.  This article has demonstrated that in several major areas of law—including 
copyright—the fairness of opt-outs weighs heavily against the unfairness of activities that 
some find objectionable.  As the discussion below will show, Google Book Search is a 
strong case for the inclusion of procedural considerations in fair use. 
A. Lessons from Contract and Privacy Law 
¶ 71 This article began with a discussion of negative option agreements used by mail 
order businesses.  Introduced by the Book-of-the-Month Club in the 1920s and still 
widely in use, this form of marketing places an unusual burden upon consumers to 
affirmatively communicate their desire not to accept goods and services.  Negative option 
agreements have a demonstrated potential to harm contractual freedoms. 
¶ 72 The National Do-Not-Call Registry is a more recent example of a similar scenario 
in the realm of telemarketing.  Where negative option agreements burden contractual 
freedom, telemarketing threatens privacy.  The older practice uses the postal system, 
while the more recent system exploits the power of the telephone. 
¶ 73 Despite the potential for harm, both negative option contracts and telemarketing 
remain legal.  As examined earlier, this is largely due to the fact that both systems use 
opt-outs.  Consumers presented with negative option offers can easily communicate their 
refusals to merchants.  Similarly, anyone can register their telephone number for free on 
the National Do-Not-Call Registry to avoid receiving calls from telemarketers.138  Both 
opt-out procedures are free, easily accessible, and simple to use.  The fairness of this 
procedure dilutes the unfair and objectionable aspects of both business practices.139 
¶ 74 Further, opt-outs benefit consumers by involving those who, through apathy or 
indifference, do not assert themselves.  Some subset of individuals in this ambivalent 
                                                 
135 Press Release, supra note 3; Press Release, The Association of American Publishers, “Publishers 
Sue Google Over Plans To Digitize Books – Google Print Library Violates Publishers’ and Authors’ 
Rights” (Oct. 19. 2005), http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=292 (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
136 See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis, J. INTERNET BANKING 
& COM., Dec. 2005, http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/2006-02/Band.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 
2007). 
137 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
138 See National Do-Not-Call Registry, supra note 57. 
139 See supra pp. 7-11.  
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group is likely to eventually benefit from the goods or services they are offered.140  This 
involvement directly benefits businesses, possibly leading to secondary benefits in the 
form of lower prices and higher quality goods and services. 
¶ 75 Finally, opt-outs in the negative option and telemarketing domains save 
businesses search costs.  Under opt-in regimes, businesses are more likely to spend 
money motivating potential customers to involve themselves.  As the formal economic 
model presented in Section I illustrates,141 the cost of motivating the public can be high, 
and it can safely be assumed that the process takes time.  If these transaction costs 
outweigh a business’s desired profits, valuable business activity will be lost.  In contrast, 
opt-out systems spare businesses transaction costs by automatically introducing products 
and services to those who would not otherwise feel motivated enough to opt in.  Our legal 
system recognizes the fact that these benefits to consumers and businesses far outweigh 
the nominal burden of opting out. 
¶ 76 Comparing these examples to Google Book Search, we follow the historical trend 
in communications technology from the postal system to the telephone to the Internet.  
Like earlier examples, Google is a business providing a service that affects a large 
number of individuals.142  Where negative option marketing threatened contractual rights 
and telemarketing threatened privacy rights, Google’s activity places a burden on 
copyrights.  Functionally, Google’s opt-out system is similar to the National Do-Not-Call 
Registry. Like that service, Google’s opt-out form is presented on a webpage that it has 
widely publicized.143  The form is easy to find, easy to use, and free.  Further, it permits 
both prospective and retrospective opt-outs.  Understandably, Google confirms the 
identity of copyright holders who opt-out.144  No matter how substantively objectionable 
Google Book Search might appear to authors, the opt-out procedure is certainly fair by 
comparable standards.  With these fundamental similarities in mind, we now consider 
whether Google’s opt-out shares the economic benefits of previous examples. 
¶ 77 Google Book Search’s opt-out system appears to present benefits to businesses 
and consumers by securing the involvement of apathetic individuals.  Authors who might 
initially feel ambivalent toward Google Book Search have the opportunity to be included 
by default.  Just as in previous examples, some of these individuals will benefit from the 
service—perhaps through increased sales and exposure online.  Beyond this, a powerful 
network effect is in play:  By including the works of undecided copyright holders, the 
opt-out system increases the number of books within the index.  As the index grows, the 
service will probably become more useful and popular.  Such popularity could spur a 
virtuous cycle of greater book sales, fewer opt-outs, and continued growth.  This success 
                                                 
140 The presumed strength behind telemarketing lies in its ability to sell items to consumers who would 
not otherwise purchase those goods. 
141 See supra p. 10. 
142 Currently, Google is the world’s most popular search engine.  The company website states: “Google 
is the world’s largest search engine and through its partnerships . . . responds to more search queries than 
any other service online.”  Google Corporate Information: Quick Profile, http://www.google.com/intl/ 
en/corporate/facts.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
143 Google Print Library Project Exclusion Registration, supra note 3.  
144 Id.  Not doing so could lead to the dishonest practice of competing authors removing each other’s 
books from Google Book Search to hinder sales. 
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will likely create secondary economic benefits for Google and advertisers. 
¶ 78 By providing authors with the right to opt out, as opposed to requiring an opt-in, 
Google avoids the cost of locating and contacting thousands of copyright holders.  The 
time and money it would take to locate authors and convince them to opt-in would likely 
weaken the book index considerably.  If these transaction costs were higher than 
Google’s anticipated profits, the book index itself would likely be abandoned. Thus, an 
opt-in requirement could result in the demise of a valuable service. 
¶ 79 Google Book Search is the most recent in a series of opt-out business plans that 
have threatened substantive legal rights.  The fairness of this opt-out plan is a 
counterweight against its allegedly unjust use of copyrighted works.  As in telemarketing 
and negative option agreements, Google’s opt-out benefits business and consumers by 
guaranteeing the involvement of indifferent parties, preventing needless search costs. 
B. Lessons from Class Action Rules 
¶ 80 Turning to class action suits, we shift focus from economic to social benefits.  As 
discussed in Section II, a major reason behind the 1966 switch from opt-in to opt-out 
class action enrolment rules was the problem of one-way intervention.145  However, the 
societal benefits of opting out in the class action arena far surpass this humble goal.  As 
in the business context, opt-out enrollment creates collective action benefits by including 
those who fail to respond to class notifications.  This added inertia makes opt-out class 
action suits powerful tools of justice. 
¶ 81 Google Book Search possesses a similar potential to benefit society.  As the index 
grows, readers will have an unprecedented opportunity to learn about books by means not 
previously available to them.  Researchers will be able to pinpoint subject matter that was 
traditionally hard to find.  The technology will also vastly broaden the horizons of 
younger readers more comfortable with search engines than old-fashioned library 
indexes. 
¶ 82 Publishers and authors will reap advantages as well.  As Tim O’Reilly, the well-
known publisher of computer books, recently wrote in a op-ed piece for the New York 
Times: 
A search engine for books will be revolutionary in its 
benefits.  Obscurity is a far greater threat to authors than 
copyright infringement, or even outright piracy. . . .  
Google promises an alternative to the obscurity imposed on 
most books.  It makes that great corpus of less-than-
bestseller accessible to all.  By pointing to a huge body of 
print works online, Google will offer a way to promote 
books that publishers have thrown away, creating an 
opportunity for readers to track them down and buy 
                                                 
145 See supra p. 16.  
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them.146 
¶ 83 As in class action suits, this force for social good can only operate successfully 
with the collective action benefits that come from opting out.  Under an opt-in regime, 
Google would be forced to spend large sums of money searching for and communicating 
with rights holders.  At the very least, this lost time and money would make Google Book 
Search a less powerful tool for society.  These costs might be so expensive as to make the 
project nonviable.  The massive loss to readers and copyright holders would vastly 
overshadow the single paltry benefit an opt-in would give reluctant authors. 
C. Precedent in Copyright Law 
¶ 84 Contrary to the Association of American Publishers’ claim that Google Book 
Search turns traditional copyright law “on its ear,”147 copyright law has long placed 
burdens on authors to assert their rights.  The formal notice, deposit and registration 
requirements demand that authors affirmatively act in order to enjoy the full benefits of 
their copyrights.  Although these requirements have been weakened since their inception, 
they still place a duty on those interested in defending their copyrights. 
¶ 85 Even more striking is the fact that opting out is the primary way copyright holders 
protect their online works from indexing systems like Google’s Book Search.  Using 
Robot Exclusion Headers, authors can specify which material they don’t want search 
engines to copy.  The indexing of online works would probably not be feasible under any 
other arrangement. 
¶ 86 The argument that Google Book Search should adopt an opt-in suggests that 
copyright law should afford authors of printed works greater protection than authors of 
online works already receive.  It is unclear why authors of printed works should have this 
additional privilege.  While some might argue that those who publish their works online 
somehow assume the risk of having their work indexed, this inconsistent treatment 
appears unfair:  both online and print authors share their work with the public, and digital 
works are in no way less worthy of copyright protection.  The only true difference 
between works published online and those published on paper lies in a method of 
distribution.  There is no reason why this fact should lead to disparate treatment of two 
otherwise identical groups.  Ultimately, it is clear that the burden to affirmatively act is 
rooted in copyright’s history, and has already been adopted in a context nearly identical 
to Google Book Search. 
D. Procedural Fair Use 
¶ 87 In the situations reviewed in this article, the opt-out is more than a mere courtesy 
or a gift to those who want no involvement:  it is a major force of legitimacy and fairness.  
Without the opt-out procedure, many of the activities discussed in previous sections 
would be deemed unfair. 
                                                 
146 Tim O’Reilly, Editorial, Search and Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A27. 
147 Press Release, supra note 10. 
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¶ 88 Google Book Search is a clearly analogous situation.  Here, a central actor acts 
upon a large group of individuals.  The rights of some are slightly encumbered in the face 
of economic and social benefits.  At the heart of this project lies an opt-out.   
¶ 89 However, the fair use doctrine, which will most likely be the major test of Google 
Book Search’s legality does not account for procedures like opting out.  The fair use 
doctrine requires a court to consider: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.148 
¶ 90 These factors point to fairness in substance, but do not account for fairness in 
procedure.  With no legislative framework in place, the danger exists that courts will 
ignore opt-outs or treat the procedure inconsistently, or as an afterthought.  As the 
examples from this article demonstrate, opt-outs can be central to the legitimacy of 
business practices—not side notes. 
¶ 91 Copyright law must consider and weigh the procedural fairness of opt-outs.  
Ideally, this could be accomplished through an amendment to the Copyright Act.  The 
inclusion of procedural fairness in Section 107 would make it clear that, like other fair 
use factors, opt-outs counter-balance what otherwise might be considered objectionable 
uses of copyrighted material.  Because opting out deals with the nature of a defendant’s 
use, it might be appended to the first fair use factor.  Thus, an updated version of factor 
(1) might appear as:  “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes, and including the 
existence of mitigating procedures such as opt-outs.” 
¶ 92 Ultimately, the revision of this existing factor would provide courts with a clear 
means of measuring a critically important aspect of a defendant’s use of copyrighted 
material. 
¶ 93 In time, more businesses are likely to index analog works by means similar those 
employed by Google.  Much like the early days of telemarketing, company-specific opt-
out procedures might place an unfair burden on rights holders to opt out from a multitude 
of databases.  To solve this problem, one can imagine a centralized opt-out procedure 
similar to the National Do-Not-Call Registry.  A national “Do-Not-Index” registry of this 
sort would provide rights holders with an easy means of opting-out of multiple indexing 
projects.  Copyright holders could either sign up online, or simply indicate their 
preference when registering their work. 
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¶ 94 For future works, opting-out would be even easier to accomplish.  The analog 
equivalent to a “robots.txt” statement would forgo the need to register future works in an 
opt-out database.  Just as copyright holders provide notice with the © (the letter C inside 
a circle) figure, the desire not to have a work copied for indexing purposes could be 
indicated with a [ (slash in a circle) symbol.  This symbol (or one like it) would be an 
extremely cheap and serviceable means of opting out. 
E. Conclusion 
¶ 95 Opting out has been adopted in several major areas of the law.  It adds fairness 
and legitimacy to marketing and sales practices, while generating economic activity 
valuable to businesses and consumers.  Properly administrated, it does so at little or no 
cost to those who wish to opt out.  By marshaling the masses that fail to respond to class 
notification, the opt-out system is also a tool for justice in the class action area.  Opting 
out is rooted in copyright’s history and has already been adopted in the online context. 
¶ 96 There is a common structure to all of the scenarios reviewed in this article.  In 
each case, a central actor threatens the rights of a large class of individuals.  Negative 
option agreements interfere with contractual rights.  Telemarketing infringes privacy 
rights.  Class action procedures implicate due process considerations.  In all such cases, 
however, those who fear harm have an easy means of avoiding it, and rules have been 
developed which dictate standards for notice and proper administration, ensuring that opt-
outs are fair and relatively costless. 
¶ 97 The present situation concerning Google is closely analogous.  The importance of 
opt-outs in contract, privacy, and class actions demonstrates that Google’s opt-out 
program is more than a courtesy to authors; it substantially adds to the fairness and 
legitimacy of Google Book Search.  While some authors complain of the burden an opt-
out imposes, copyright law has long placed burdens on authors through formal 
registration, notice and deposit requirements.  Further, opting out is already a dominant 
mode of choice in protecting works published online. 
¶ 98 The quality of a meal cannot be determined solely by its ingredients, but how 
those ingredients are prepared.  The same is true in determining the legitimacy of large-
scale business and legal actions—fairness is a product of both substance and procedure.  
Recognizing this, major areas of the law endorse opt-outs.  Google Book Search is not 
the first, and certainly will not be the last digital indexing service to raise copyright 
concerns.  The controversy stirred by this project exposes copyright’s lack of recognition 
for fair procedures like opt-outs.  Valuable economic activity and important social gains 
will be realized through the recognition in copyright law of procedural fair use. 
